This right to secede is deduced from the nature of the Constitution,
which, they say, is a compact between sovereign states, who have
preserved their whole sovereignty, and, therefore, are subject to no
superior; that, because they made the compact, they can break it when,
in their opinion, it has been departed from by the other states.
Fallacious as this course of reasoning is, it enlists state pride, and
finds advocates in the honest prejudices of those who have not studied
the nature of our government sufficiently to see the radical error on
which it rests.
The people of the United States formed the Constitution, acting through
the state legislatures in making the compact to meet and discuss its
provisions, and acting in separate conventions when they ratified those
provisions; but the terms used in its construction show it to be a
government in which the people of all the states collectively are
represented. We are ONE PEOPLE in the choice of the President and
Vice-President. Here the states have no other agency than to direct the
mode in which the votes shall be given. The candidates having the
majority of all the votes are chosen. The electors of a majority of
states may have given their votes for one candidate, and yet another
may be chosen. The people, then, and not the states, are represented in
the executive branch.
In the House of Representatives there is this difference, that the
people of one state do not, as in the case of President and
Vice-President, all vote for the same officers. The people of all the
States do not vote for all the members, each state electing only its
own representatives. But this creates no material distinction. When
chosen, they are all representatives of the United States, not
representatives of the particular state from whence they come. They are
paid by the United States, not by the state, nor are they accountable
to it for any act done in the performance of their legislative
functions; and however they may, in practice, as it is their duty to
do, consult and prefer the interests of their particular constituents
when they come in conflict with any other partial or local interest,
yet it is either first and highest duty, as representatives of the
United States, to promote the general good.
The Constitution of the United States, then, forms a government, not a
league; and whether it be formed by compact between the states, or in
any other manner, its character is the same. It is a government in
which all the people are represented, which operates directly on the
people individually, not noon the states. They retained all the power
they did not grant but each state, having expressly parted with so many
powers as to constitute; jointly with the other states, a single
nation; cannot, from that period, possess any right to secede, because
such secession does not break a league, but destroys the unity of a
nation; and any injury to that unity is not only a breach which would
result from the contravention of a compact but it is an offence against
the whole Union. To say that any state may at pleasure secede from the
Union, is to say that the United States are not a nation; because it
would be a solecism to contend that any part of a nation might
dissolve its connection with the other parts, to their [590] injury or
ruin, without committing any offence. Secession, like any other
revolutionary act, may be morally justified by the extremity of
oppression; but to call it a constitutional right, is confounding the
meaning of terms, and can only be done through gross error, or to
deceive those who are willing to assert a right, but would pause before
they made a revolution, or incur the penalties consequent on a failure.
Because the Union was formed by compact, it is said the parties to that
compact may, when they feel themselves aggrieved, depart from it; but
it is precisely because it is a compact that they cannot. A compact is
an agreement or binding obligation. It may, by its terms, have a
sanction or penalty for its breach, or it may not. If it contains no
sanction, it may be broken with no other consequence than moral guilt:
if it have a sanction, then the breach insures the designated or
implied penalty. A league between
independent nations, generally, has no sanction other than a moral one;
or if it should contain a penalty, as there is no common superior, it
cannot be enforced. A government, on the contrary, always has a
sanction, express or implied; and, in our case, it is both necessarily
implied and expressly given. An attempt, by force of arms, to destroy
government, is an offence, by whatever means the constitutional compact
may have been formed; and such government has the right, by the law of
self-defence, to pass acts for
punishing the offender, unless that right is modified, restrained, or
resumed, by the constitutional act. In our system, although it is
modified in the case of treason, yet authority is expressly given to
pass all laws necessary to carry its powers into effect, and, under
this grant, provision has been made for punishing acts which obstruct
the due administration of the laws.
It would seem superfluous to add any thing to show the nature of that
union which connects us; but, as erroneous opinions on this subject are
the foundation of doctrines the most destructive to our peace, I must
give some further development to my views on this subject. No one,
fellow-citizens, has a higher reverence for the reserved rights of the
states than the magistrate who now addresses you. No one would make
greater personal
sacrifices, or official exertions, to defend them from violation; but
equal care must be taken to prevent, on their part, an improper
interference with, or resumption of, the rights they have vested in the
nation. The line has not been so distinctly drawn as to avoid doubts,
in some cases, of the exercise of power. Men of the best intentions and
soundest views may differ in their construction of some parts of the
Constitution; but there are others on which dispassionate reflection
can leave no doubt. Of this nature appears to be the assumed right of
secession.
It rests, as we have seen, on the alleged undivided sovereignty of the
states, and on their having formed, in this sovereign capacity, a
compact which is called the Constitution, from which, because they made
it, they have the right to secede. Both of these positions are
erroneous, and some of the arguments to prove them so have been
anticipated.
The states severally have not retained their entire sovereignty.
It has been shown that, in becoming parts of a nation, not members of a
league, they surrendered many of their essential parts of sovereignty.
The right to make treaties, declare war, levy taxes, exercise exclusive
judicial and legislative powers, were all of them functions of
sovereign power. The states, then, for all these purposes, were no
longer sovereign The allegiance of their citizens was transferred, in
the first instance, to the government of the United States: they became
American citizens, and [591] owed obedience to the Constitution of the
United States, and to laws made in conformity with the powers it vested
in Congress. This last position has not been, and cannot be, denied.
How, then, can that state be said to be sovereign and independent whose
citizens owe obedience to laws act made by it, and whose magistrates
are sworn to disregard those laws when they come in conflict with those
passed by another? What shows conclusively that the states cannot be
said to have reserved an undivided sovereignty, is, that they expressly
ceded the right to punish treason,-not treason against their separate
power, but treason against the United States, Treason is an offence
against sovereignty, and sovereignty must reside with the power to
punish it. But the reserved rights of the states are not less sacred
because they have, for their common interest, made the general
government the depository of these powers.
The unity of our political character (as has been shown for another
purpose)
commenced with its very existence. Under the royal government we had no
separate character: our opposition to its oppressions began as united
colonies. We were the United States under the Confederation; and the
name was perpetuated, and the union rendered more perfect, by the
Federal Constitution. In none of these stages did we consider ourselves
in any other light than as forming one nation. Treaties and alliances
were made in the name of all. Troops were raised for the joint defence.
How, then, with all these proofs that, under all changes of our
position, we had, for designated purposes and defined powers, created
national governments--how is it that the most perfect of those several
modes of union should now be considered as a mere league that maybe
dissolved at pleasure? It is from an abuse of terms. Compact is used as
synonymous with league, although the true term is not employed, because
it would at once show the fallacy of the reasoning. It would not do to
say that our Constitution was only a league, but it is labored to prove
it a compact, (which in one sense it is,) and then to argue that, as a
league is a compact, every compact between nations must of course be a
league, and that from such an engagement every sovereign power has a
right to recede. But it has been shown that, in this sense, the states
are not sovereign, and that, even if they were, and the national
Constitution had been formed by compact, there would be no right in any
one state to
exonerate itself from its obligations.
So obvious are the reasons which forbid this secession, that it is
necessary only to allude to them. The union was formed for the benefit
of all. It was produced by mutual sacrifices of interests and opinions.
can those sacrifices be recalled? Can the states, who magnanimously
surrendered their title to the territories of the west, recall the
grant? Will the inhabitants of the inland states agree to pay the
duties that may be imposed without their assent by those on the
Atlantic or the Gulf, for their own benefit? Shall there be a free port
in one state, and onerous duties in another. No one believes that any
right exists in a single state to involve the other in these and
countless other evils, contrary to the engagements solemnly made. Every
one must see that the other states, in self-defence, must oppose it at
all hazards.
Elliot, Jonathan, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution, as Recommended by the General
Convention at Philadelphia in 1787. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott &
Co., 1836-59. 5 v., "President Jackson's Proclamation, of the 10th
December, 1833, concerning the Ordinance of South Carolina, on the
Subject of the Tariff, on the 24th November, 1832," vol. IV, pp
582-592
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(ed004101))
Bob
Judy and Bob Huddleston
10643 Sperry Street
Northglenn, CO 80234-3612
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"Le sens communn'est pas si commun." Voltaire